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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
language of Owen is ambiguous and will require further clarifi-
cation, but as a general proposition the decision presents a
three part analysis. First, it must be determined whether the
federal and nonfederal claims comprise a single constitutional
case. If the nonfederal claim does not arise from the "common
nucleus of operative fact," then the inquiry will be at an end,
since the claim is outside the constitutional limits of jurisdic-
tion. Second, if the constitutional test is met, the relevant stat-
ute must be examined to determine whether Congress has ne-
gated the exercise of jurisdiction. Last, if a statutory negation
is found, then the context in which the nonfederal claim is
asserted must be examined to determine whether it should
permit a circumvention of the negation. Exactly what type of
context will be sufficient to permit circumvention is uncertain.
Also, there may be some cases where context will be irrelevant.
While leaving a number of unresolved questions as to scope and
interpretation, in requiring this three part test, Owen may bur-
den the courts with time consuming examinations of congres-
sional intent and limit, to some extent, the efficiency, economy
and fairness intended to be fostered by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
IGOR POTYM
JUDGES - Immunities - Judicial Act and Jurisdiction
Broadly Defined. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
Since 1871, the Supreme Court has made available a very
broad privilege of immunity to judges of courts of general juris-
diction in civil actions when such actions arise out of judicial
acts not done in the complete absence of jurisdiction.' In the
recent case of Stump v. Sparkman,2 the United States Su-
preme Court again considered the defense of judicial immunity
and, for the first time, offered some definition of what consti-
tutes a judicial act. In this author's view, in putting forward a
broad definition of judicial act, and in reaffirming the use of a
broad construction of jurisdiction in immunity cases, the Court
"to the arduous and ultimately wasteful task of guessing what state law is on issues
upon which only the state court can authoritatively act." Id. at 4-5. The bill has been
reintroduced in the 96th Congress. H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
2. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
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assured the maintenance of a nearly absolute immunity privi-
lege for judges in courts of general jurisdiction when they ap-
pear to be acting in a judicial capacity.
Sparkman involved alleged violations of plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights,3 which were said to have occurred during the
process culminating in Linda Sparkman's involuntary sterili-
zation. Prior to the operation, the sterilization had been ap-
proved by Harold Stump, a judge in an Indiana court of general
jurisdiction, after a petition by Ms. Sparkman's mother to have
her daughter sterilized was filed in his court. The petition was
granted the day it was presented, in an ex parte proceeding
without a hearing. Neither the petition nor the order were ever
filed or recorded; no notice was given the daughter; nor was a
guardian ad litem appointed. The operation was performed
seven days later after Ms. Sparkman was told she was to have
her appendix removed. Two years later, after Ms. Sparkman's
marriage, when she consulted a doctor concerning her inability
to conceive, she was informed that she had been sterilized.4
In response, Ms. Sparkman and her husband filed a federal
action under 42 U.S.C. § § 1983 and 19855 against Judge Stump,
together with pendent.state claims for assault and battery and
malpractice against her mother, the mother's attorney, the
doctors involved in the surgery, and the hospital where it was
performed. Judge Stump's motion to dismiss based on the de-
fense of judicial immunity was granted in the district court and
the entire action was then dismissed.'
A three judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously reversed the district court, holding that the de-
fense of judicial immunity was not available to Judge Stump,
3. The Supreme Court majority referred to the district court's summary of the
constitutional claims asserted: violations of due process, equal protection, the right of
privacy, the right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment and the right to pro-
create. Id. at 1103.
4. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977).
5. (1970). Section 1983, originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13, reads in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
6. The claims against the remaining defendants were dismissed since it was held
that without Judge Stump's presence in the case, there could be no showing of the state
action necessary under section 1983. Civil No. F75-129 (N.D. Ind., filed May 13, 1976).
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first because he had acted extrajudicially in ordering the steri-
lization and second, because the act in question was performed
without jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court, however, in a five-
three decision, again reversed, holding that the judicial im-
munity defense did protect Judge Stump.' The majority and
minority views in Sparkman represent two historical positions
on the breadth of protection which should be afforded under
the judicial immunity privilege, and these opinions must nec-
essarily be examined in the light of this history.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The first United States Supreme Court case regarding judi-
cial immunity was Randall v. Brigham, I decided in 1868. In the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Field recognized the
qualified immunity available to judges under English common
law.'0 Under this doctrine, no judge was immune from prosecu-
tion for malicious or corrupt judicial acts; further, inferior
court judges were subject to prosecution for acts in excess of
their jurisdiction.
However, in 1871, with the case of Bradley v. Fisher," the
Supreme Court, in another opinion written by Justice Field,
abandoned the qualified immunity doctrine in favor of a doc-
trine of absolute judicial immunity: "[J]udges of courts of
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for
their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
7. 552 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977).
8. 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
9. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). The Justices' Protection Act of 1848, 11 & 12 Vict.,
c. 44, § 1, provided that an inferior court justice, acting within his jurisdiction, could
be sued for conduct proven to be malicious and without reasonable and probable cause.
Motivation was irrelevant as to such justice acting in excess of his jurisdiction. A
superior court judge, acting even in excess of his jurisdiction, would be immune.
10. Mr. Justice Field expanded the concept of immunity for malicious judicial acts
by applying it to all judges, not solely to inferior court judges as had been the limit
imposed by the English courts.
[Ilt is a general principle applicable to all judicial officers, that they are not
liable to a civil action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction. In
reference to judges of limited and inferior authority, it has been held that they
are protected only when they act within their jurisdiction. If this be the case
with respect to them, no such limitation exists with respect to judges of superior
or general authority. They are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the
acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 535-36.
11. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
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corruptly."' 2 After Bradley, judges were provided a defense in
all actions brought by persons alleging malicious judicial con-
duct.
While Bradley was being argued, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1871' 3 which created a federal remedy for civil
rights violations perpetrated under color of state law. The Act
imposed liability upon "every person" who, under color of state
law, deprived another of his or her civil rights; it appeared to
provide statutory authority for relief from judicial abuse. There
is no convincing proof that Congress intended that immunity
would be available to any state or territorial officials in actions
under the Act, and it is more likely that the Forty-Second
Congress intended to do away with whatever common-law
immunities existed.' 4
Nevertheless, over the next hundred years, there was never
a consistent recognition that the judicial immunity defense had
been abrogated in section 1983 actions. The dominant line of
cases found judges immune from suit on the basis of Bradley,
even in civil rights cases. 5 However, the exceptions to judicial
immunity enunciated in Bradley were recognized in section
1983 actions also: (1) instances in which judges acted in clear
absence of jurisdiction" and (2) instances where judges en-
gaged in nonjudicial activities. 7 But a maverick line of cases
held that judicial immunity was simply not a valid defense to
12. Id. at 351. Justice Field justifies the shift away from liability depending on the
motive of the judge by noting that "[the allegation of malicious or corrupt motives
could always be made, and if the motives could be inquired into judges would be
subjected to the same vexatious litigation upon such allegations, whether the motives
had or had not any real existence." Id. at 354.
13. Ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
14. See Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 365-66, 385 (1871); Note, Liability
of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J., 322, 325 (1969).
15. Berg v. Cwiklinski, 416 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1969); Franklin v. Meredith, 386 F.2d
958 (10th Cir. 1967); Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); Harvey v.
Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Agnew v. Moody, 330 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1964);
Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955); Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.
1953); Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Roberts v. Williams,
302 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Pa.
1967); Haigh v. Snidow, 231 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Griffin v. Connally, 127 F.
Supp. 203 (S.D. Tex. 1955); Ginsburg v. Stem, 125 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1954);
Morgan v. Sylvester, 125 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Souther v. Reid, 101 F. Supp.
806 (E.D. Va. 1951).
16. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d
818 (6th Cir. 1970); Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1932).
17. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3rd Cir. 1966); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d
533 (9th Cir. 1965); Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963).
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suit brought under section 1983.' s Finally, in 1967, in Pierson
v. Ray, 9 the Supreme Court resolved the uncertainty regarding
the applicability of the judicial immunity defense in actions
under section 1983. There, Chief Justice Warren ruled that a
state judge who had convicted civil rights demonstrators of
disorderly conduct was immune from liability, noting that he
had played no role in the arrest and conviction other than to
adjudge petitioners guilty when their cases came before his
court.20 The eight member majority reaffirmed the applicabil-
ity of the judicial immunity defense under the Civil Rights Act:
We do not believe that this settled principle of law was
abolished by § 1983, which makes liable "every person" who
under color of law deprives another person of his civil rights.
The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress
meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities. Ac-
cordingly, this Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove, . . . that
the immunity of legislators for acts within the legislative role
was not abolished. The immunity of judges for acts within the
judicial role is equally well established, and we presume that
Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish the doctrine.2"
18. See McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1949); Picking v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1945). In Picking, the Third Circuit held that
judicial immunity was not a valid defense to a suit brought under section 1983. The
court reasoned that judicial immunity was a common-law rule which Congress was
empowered to change. "We think that the conclusion is irresistible that Congress by
enacting the Civil Rights Act sub judice intended to abrogate the privilege to the
extent indicated by that act and in fact did so." Id. at 250.
19. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
20. Petitioners had attempted to suggest a "conspiracy" between the presiding
judge and the police officers. The proof of such conspiracy never went beyond the
suggestion that inferences could be drawn from the judge's judicial decisions. Id. at
553 n.8.
21. Id. at 554-55 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court also discussed justifica-
tions for judicial immunity. They reasoned that a judge's independent decisionmaking
would be compromised by the prospect of a lawsuit after every decision. Moreover, a
judge should not have to risk the depletion of his personal resources in the defense of
vexatious or harassing suits, even if he could easily prevail. See Jennings, Tort Liabil-
ity of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1936), who lists nine
identifiable reasons for the immunity rule; these include the benefits of 1) saving
judges' time; 2) preventing influence on decisions through fear of subsequent suit; 3)
removing discouragement to judicial service; 4) assuring separation of powers; 5) safe-
guarding the finality of decisions; 6) utilizing alternate avenues of redress for erroneous
decisions; 7) refraining from unfairly penalizing honest error; 8) recognizing that
judges' duties are directed to the public rather than to individuals; and 9) noting the
fact of judicial self-protection. See also Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the
Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 615 (1970).
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Despite vigorous dissent concerning the legislative intent 2  and
history23 of the Act, the majority gave a broad construction to
judicial immunity even in section 1983 cases. This same broad
construction is reflected in the majority opinion of Stump v.
Sparkman.
I1. THE OPINIONS
The majority opinion in Sparkman, written by Justice
White representing a five member majority,24 cites Pierson to
support the determination that the doctrine of judicial im-
munity is applicable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2s Justice
White discussed that point no further, and directed the greater
part of his opinion to a consideration of the only recognized
exceptions to the doctrine of judicial immunity: (1) acts that
cannot be characterized as judicial acts26 and (2) acts done in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction.2 7
A. "Judicial Act"
The first exception to absolute judicial immunity arises
when the act in question cannot be classified as "judicial."
Early British judges cguld be held liable for acts ministerial in
nature, but not for acts discretionary in nature.rs Similarly,
that distinction is often employed today in determining what
22. In Pierson v. Ray, Justice Douglas, dissenting, stated that he did not think
"that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct are
immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. . . . To most, 'every person'
would mean every person, not every person except judges." 386 U.S. at 558-59 (empha-
sis in original).
23. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was designed to supplement an 1866
statute that clearly included judges. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)). This statute provided a criminal remedy
for the same deprivations for which section 1 provided a civil remedy.
24. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens joined in
the opinion. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and
Powell joined. Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Brennan took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case.
25. 98 S. Ct. at 1104.
26. See Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lynch v. Johnson, 420
F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963); Penn v.
Eubanks, 360 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
27. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Weinstein, 333 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 459
F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1972); Joyce v. Hickey, 337 Mass. 118, 147 N.E.2d 187 (1958); Utley
v. City of Independence, 240 Or. 384, 402 P.2d 91 (1965).
28. See, e.g., Prickett v. Gratiex, 115 Eng. Rep. 1158 (K.B. 1846); Davis v. Capper,
109 Eng. Rep. 362 (K.B. 1829); 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 239 n.4
(1924).
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acts of public officials are immune from liability.2 9 Sparkman
reiterates another well-established rule that "judicial" acts
render a judge immune from liability,311 while "nonjudicial"
acts do not.3 1 The majority describes two tests to determine
whether an act of a judge is a "judicial" one: (1) the nature of
the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and (2) the expectation of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.32
The Sparkman majority found that "both factors indicate
that Judge Stump's approval of the sterilization petition was
a judicial act. ' 3  As to the nature of the act, White wrote:
"State judges with general jurisdiction not infrequently are
called upon in their official capacity to approve petitions relat-
ing to the affairs of minors, as for example, a petition to settle
a minor's claim. ' 34 As to the expectation of the parties, he says:
"We may infer from the record that it was only because Judge
Stump served in that position [county circuit judge] that Mrs.
McFarlin, on the advice of counsel, submitted the petition to
him for his approval. '35
Justice Stewart, writing for the dissenting justices, not only
faults White's definition of judicial act but also his application
of the majority test: "I think that the first of these grounds
[function normally performed by a judge] is factually untrue
and that the second [dealing with judge in judicial capacity]
is legally unsound. ' 36 Stewart notes that the act in question,
the approval of a parent's decision regarding medical treat-
29. Cords v. Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977). This recent Wiscon-
sin decision reaffirmed the Wisconsin position that a public official may be held liable
for negligent performance of purely ministerial duties.
30. 98 S. Ct. at 1106. See generally Wiggins v. Hess, 531 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1976)
(judge who sentenced a misdemeanant to prison when the offense carried no prison
sentence held immune from suit); Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) (judge who committed an individual to a state
hospital under a previously repealed statute held immune from suit).
31. 98 S. Ct. at 1106. See generally Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.
1974) (justice of the peace who bodily assaulted a person in his courtroom held not
immune); Lucarell v. McNair, 453 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972) (juvenile court referee
without power to incarcerate who ordered incarceration of juvenile held not immune);
Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963) (judge who after disqualifying himself
from a case interfered with the proceedings and filed a false affidavit therein held not
immune).
32. 98 S.Ct. at 1107.
33. Id. (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 1108.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1109.
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ment for a minor, is not a function normally performed by a
judge. "Indeed, there is no reason to believe that such an act
has ever been performed by any other Indiana judge, either
before or since. '37
Stewart also questions the second part of the test: "But
false illusions as to a judge's power can hardly convert a judge's
response to those illusions into a judicial act; '38 neither, in the
minority view, does a judicial act result from the simple affix-
ation of the title "judge" under a signature: "[T]he conduct
of a judge surely does not become a judicial act merely on his
own say-so. A judge is not free, like a loose cannon, to inflict
indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is act-
ing in his judicial capacity. '39
For the minority, in order for an act to be judicial at least
some of the attributes of a judicial proceeding must be present.
Justice Stewart suggests that there must be a case or contro-
versy, there must be litigants, there must be some avenue of
appeal and there must be at least "the pretext of principled
decisionmaking."4 ° For Justice Powell, writing in a separate
dissent, it is the absence of appellate or political remedies
which clearly marks this act as nonjudicial, since it is the pres-
ence of such alternative relief which provides the basis of judi-
cial immunity in the first place.4'
While, unlike the minority, the majority does not specifi-
cally describe what they perceive to be the attributes of a judi-
cial act, they do cite previous cases which have held that lack
of formal proceedings 4 and separation from court facilities"3 do
not automatically preclude a judicial act. In contrast, acts done
by a judge acting in another official capacity4 or characterized
by outrageous behavior 45 have been held to be beyond the pale
of judicial behavior.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Sparkman has offered a two
pronged test to determine whether the act of a judge is a
37. Id. at 1110 (emphasis in original).
38. Id.
39. Id. (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 1111.
41. Id. at 1111-12.
42. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
43. McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Penn v. Eubanks, 360 F. Supp.
699 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
45. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d
273 (7th Cir. 1963).
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"judicial" one, and while it has not offered clear guides to use
of the test, it is clear that broad and generous analysis will be
used to determine if a judge's act is "judicial" to the point
where it merits absolute immunity.
B. "Clear Absence of All Jurisdiction"
Definition of judicial act was the primary area of disagree-
ment between the majority and minority in Sparkman and
formed the basis of discussion in the preceding section of this
note. Since the Supreme Court minority did not reach the ju-
risdictional issue," and since complete lack of jurisdiction was
the primary basis of decision in the court of appeals, it is the
contrast between the definition of jurisdiction espoused by the
Seventh Circuit and the definition put forward by the
Sparkman majority which forms the organizational basis of
this section.
Justice White relies on Bradley to establish the general rule
of construction regarding jurisdiction in immunity cases:
"[J]udges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not
liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such
acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have
been done maliciously or corruptly."4 This sets the issue, the
definition of a line between acts done in excess of jurisdiction
and acts done in the complete absence of jurisdiction.
The Seventh Circuit had held that for jurisdiction to be
present when a judge operates under a state grant of general
jurisdiction" there must be a statutory or common-law basis
for the exercise of judicial power:
Although this grant of judicial power is broad, we cannot
accept the assertion that it cloaks an Indiana circuit judge
46. 98 S. Ct. at 1110 n.5.
47. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
48. IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1976) provides:
Jurisdiction
Sec. 3. Said court shall have original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law
and in equity whatsoever, and in criminal cases and actions for divorce, except
where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is, or may be conferred by law upon
justices of the peace. It shall also have exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement
of decedents' estates and of guardianships: Provided, however, That in counties
in which criminal or superior courts exist or may be organized, nothing in this
section shall be construed to deprive such courts of the jurisdiction conferred
upon them by laws, and it shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be
conferred by law, and it shall have jurisdiction of all other causes, matters and
proceedings where exclusive jurisdiction thereof is not conferred by law upon
some other court, board or officer.
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with blanket immunity. He may not arbitrarily order or ap-
prove anything presented to him in the form of an affidavit
or petition. A claim must be characterized as a case in law
or equity in order to come within the statute. In short, it must
have a statutory or common law basis."
Indiana statutes allow court authorized sterilization only
when the person to be sterilized is institutionalized, and even
that power is strictly limited by numerous procedural require-
ments. " Thus, the court of appeals had held that the statutory
scheme in Indiana negates jurisdiction in cases not involving
institutionalized persons.-' The Seventh Circuit seems to have
followed the rule that a court of general jurisdiction, while
engaged in the exercise of a special statutory power, becomes
a court of limited jurisdiction with powers restricted to the
authority given by statute.-2
The Supreme Court majority, on the other hand, uses an
inverse reasoning process. Because "the scope of the judge's
jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is...
immunity, '5 3 the Supreme Court defines the plaintiffs burden
of proof not as the necessity of proving absence of a statutory
or common-law basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, but rather
as the necessity of citing a statute or case law prohibiting the
exercise of jurisdiction: "We agree with the District Court, it
appearing that neither by statute or case law has the broad
jurisdiction granted to the circuit courts of Indiana been cir-
cumscribed to foreclose consideration of a petition for authori-
zation of a minor's sterilization."54 This conclusion follows from
the rule that a court has the power and duty to determine
whether it has jurisdiction of a matter presented to it.- '
The Indiana statute governing sterilization is in keeping
49. 552 F.2d at 174.
50. The subjects of such actions were guaranteed the right to notice, the oppor-
tunity to defend and the right of appeal. IND. CODE §§ 16-13-13-1 through 16-13-13-6
(1971) (repealed 1974).
51. 552 F.2d at 175.
52. State v. Taylor, 323 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). This case involved
the deprivation of parental custody and was used by the court in In re M.K.R., 515
S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974), where the court developed an analogy between the termination
of parental custody and the termination of the right to bear children.
53. 98 S.Ct. at 1105.
54. Id. at 1105-06.
55. Carmichael v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 156 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa 1968); Niles
v. Marine Colloids, Inc., 249 A.2d 277 (Me. 1969); Appeal of Matheisel, 107 N.H. 479,
224 A.2d 832 (1966).
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with those of the majority of jurisdictions which impose rigid
statutory restrictions on the power to authorize any steriliza-
tion procedure56 in evidence of the sensitivity of the area. In this
author's view, limitations on judicial entry into such sensitive
areas must be controlled in some manner, either by legislative
enactment or by a more narrow definition of jurisdiction in
immunity cases.57 Since the Supreme Court has chosen to sanc-
tion a broad grant of power to courts of general jurisdiction
entering into sensitive areas even when they do so by assump-
tion of jurisdiction, Sparkman clearly demonstrates the neces-
sity of specific legislative enactment as a prerequisite to limita-
tions on judicial action in these fields.
III. CONCLUSION
It is evident from Sparkman that the two exceptions to
judicial immunity do not have clearly enunciated standards.
The court of appeals argued vigorously that the act of authoriz-
ing a sterilization procedure was in clear absence of all jurisdic-
tion; the same act was held by the Supreme Court majority to
have been performed as an exercise of jurisdiction. Three Su-
preme Court justices said the respondent's actions were not
"judicial," but five had no doubt that it was a judicial act.
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has qualified the
common-law immunities provided other government officials
when suit is brought against them under section 1983. Federal
officials were immune from suit" until the Supreme Court re-
cently modified that rule in Butz v. Economou.5 5 The prior
absolute immunity afforded state officials' was also qualified
in Scheuer v. Rhodes."1 Longstanding law holding municipali-
ties immune62 was overturned when the Court recently held
that local governments were intended to be included among the
56. See, e.g., Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 356 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Kemp
v. Kemp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d
579 (Ky. App. 1968); Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
57. There is little doubt that more interpersonal privacy issues will face judicial
review in the future. Abortion, test-tube procreation and cloning are obvious examples.
58. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
59. 46 U.S.L.W. 4952 (1978). The Court held that federal executive officials are
entitled only to qualified immunity, and that there is no substantial basis for holding
that executive officers may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known
to them to violate the Constitution.
60. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
61. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
62. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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"persons" to which section 1983 applies." Yet, in the face of
these trends, the doctrine of judicial immunity has held fast.
The most solid conclusion to be drawn from Sparkman v.
Stump is that regardless of the degree of injury resulting from
judicial conduct, the judiciary will continue to immunize its
brethren with a generous hand,
ANN BOWE
PROPERTY-Subject to Financing Clause-Escalator
Provision in Mortgage Commitment Fails to Satisfy Specif-
icity Requirement in Offer to Purchase. Woodland Realty,
Inc. v. Winzenried, 82 Wis. 2d 218, 262 N.W.2d 106 (1978).
"It would seem to behoove brokers, attorneys and parties to
avoid such clauses as they would a plague."' As illustrated by
a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Woodland Realty,
Inc. v. Winzenried,2 this recommendation concerning subject
to financing clauses3 has proven to be accurate. The clause in
the offer to purchase real estate has been fertile ground for
litigation. Changes have been suggested and made, but often
to little avail. A brief overview of these changes will demon-
strate the types of problems encountered, and the clause used
in Woodland and in other recent cases will be examined. These
clauses have developed as a result of court suggested changes.
Yet Woodland demonstrates the continuing 
